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Abstract
We consider two simple variants of a framework for reasoning about
knowledge amongst communicating groups of players. Our goal is to clar-
ify the resulting epistemic issues. In particular, we investigate what is the
impact of common knowledge of the underlying hypergraph connecting
the players, and under what conditions common knowledge distributes
over disjunction. We also obtain two versions of the classic result that
common knowledge cannot be achieved in the absence of a simultaneous
event (here a message sent to the whole group).
1 Introduction
We introduce a framework for reasoning about communication amongst groups
of players. We assume that each player is a member of a certain number of
groups, and that he is able to broadcast synchronously information to each of
those groups. Thus there is what we call an interaction structure, a hy-
pergraph of the players, that determines the communication protocol. We are
interested in studying what players can learn in certain restricted communica-
tion settings, what impact common knowledge of the underlying hypergraph can
have, and in properties of the resulting knowledge that can simplify reasoning
about it.
For example, consider Figure 1. If player i knows that he is in interaction
structure (a), and he learns a fact from player j that initially only player n
knew, then i can deduce that both l and k also must have learned that fact. In
interaction structure (b), he can only deduce that either of them has learned
it, but not which one. If i does not know the interaction structure, he cannot
draw such conclusions, since player n might as well have communicated with
player j directly. One particular focus of our discussion concerns conditions
∗To appear in Proceedings of TARK 2009
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Figure 1: Two interaction structures. Hyperarcs are shown in gray.
under which knowledge of a disjunction does allow us to deduce knowledge of
one particular disjunct, thus simplifying reasoning in such situations. Another
focus is to analyze the conditions for attaining common knowledge.
In the following Section 2, we first set up a more restricted framework where
players can only communicate those facts that they initially know, and we exam-
ine this framework in detail in Section 3. In Section 4 we then lift this restriction
and examine how the properties of knowledge are affected when players are al-
lowed to send information which they learned from other players. In Section 5
we discuss related work, in particular two closely related frameworks from the
literature, and draw some conclusions. We look at some possible extensions in
Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We assume the following setup to be common knowledge among the players.
There is a set of players N . Each player i ∈ N has a private set Ati of facts
(atomic propositions), of which only player i initially knows whether they are
true. The truth values of these facts are represented by a valuation, which
can be written as a set V ⊆ At containing those facts that are true, where
At =
⋃
i∈N Ati. By Vi, we denote V ∩Ati, the restriction of V to i’s facts.
Throughout, we assume communication to be truthful in the sense that it
only contains information the sender knows to be true.
An interaction structure for players N is a tuple (H, (Ati)i∈N ), where H
is a hypergraph on N , i.e., a set of non-empty subsets of N , called hyperarcs,
and the Ati are pairwise disjoint sets.
In the present section we place two restrictions, that are related. Firstly,
we use unordered sets of messages, i.e. without any temporal structure, since it
only matters whether a given message has been broadcast or not, and not when
it was broadcast. Secondly, we only allow messages of the form (i, A, p) with
i ∈ A ∈ H and p ∈ Ati. That is, players only broadcast basic facts that ‘belong’
to them. In Section 4 we partially lift these restrictions, allowing more general
forms of broadcast. This in turn means introducing some temporal ordering
since if the message (i, A, p) occurs, with p 6∈ Ati, then everybody in A knows
that before that broadcast there was another broadcast of the form (·, B, p) with
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i ∈ B, since otherwise i could not have known p.
Given these restrictions, we consider two different situations: one in which
the underlying hypergraph is commonly known amongst the players; and one
in which it is not, in the sense that a player knows only the hyperarcs to which
he belongs.
In each case an interaction structure defines a communication protocol: each
player i can at any point broadcast any true fact p ∈ Ati to any hyperarc A ∈ H
with i ∈ A. Thus a message is a tuple (i, A, p) with i ∈ A and p ∈ Ati; (i, A, p)
is the message in which i communicates among the group A his fact p. H-
compliant messages are those in which A ∈ H. If the players consider only
H-compliant messages possible, then they know the underlying hypergraph H.
So if the model allows only H-compliant messages, the underlying hypergraph H
is common knowledge among the players; if it uses all messages, H is unknown.
We next define our model formally in order to reason about the knowledge
of the players and how it changes as messages are broadcast. This is roughly
along the lines of history based models (see, e.g., Pacuit and Parikh (2007);
Fagin et al. (1995)). We start by defining a state, which we might also have
called ‘possible world’, (V,M) to consist of a valuation V ⊆ At and a set M of
messages (·, ·, p) such that p ∈ V . An H-compliant state is one where M only
contains H-compliant messages.
A word over a set A ⊆ N is a finite sequence w = i1 . . . ik where each il ∈ A.
By A∗ we denote the set of all words over A, and we write Set(w) for the set of
players occurring in w.
Now given a set of messages M and a word w, we introduce the following
notation:
Mw := {(·, A, ·) ∈M | Set(w) ⊆ A}
Facts(M) := {p | (·, ·, p) ∈M}.
So Mi (respectively, Mw) is the subset of the set of messages M that player
i received (respectively, that were broadcast to all the players in w; note that
the order in w does not matter), and Facts(M) is the set of facts that were
communicated in the messages in M . In particular, Facts(Mi) is the set of facts
that were communicated in the messages in M that player i received. Note that
(V,M) is a state if Facts(M) ⊆ V . Further, we define all set operations to act
component-wise on states, e.g. (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′) iff V ⊆ V ′ and M ⊆M ′.
In order to represent the knowledge of the players we
define an indistinguishability relation between states:
(V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) iff (Vi,Mi) = (V ′i ,M ′i).
In the semantics we present below, a player i is said to ‘know’ a fact just if
that fact is true in every state that is indistinguishable for i from the actual state.
Of particular interest to us is the knowledge of groups G ⊆ N (always assumed
to be non-empty). Specifically we consider the so-called ‘common knowledge’
among a group (cf. (Fagin et al., 1995, p. 23)). These are facts that everybody
in the group knows, they all know that they know, etc. To define this formally
we extend the individual indistiguishability relation to groups: for G ⊆ N the
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relation ∼G is the transitive closure of
⋃
i∈G ∼i.
We are interested in properties definable by the following epistemic lan-
guage L:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | CGϕ,
where the atoms p denote the facts in At, ¬, ∧ and ∨ are the standard con-
nectives; and CG is a knowledge operator, with CGϕ meaning ϕ is common
knowledge among G. We write Ki for C{i}; Kiϕ can be read ‘i knows that ϕ’.
The positive language L+ is the sublanguage of L in which negation (¬) does
not occur.
The semantics for L is as follows:
(V,M) H p iff p ∈ V,
(V,M) H ¬ϕ iff (V,M) 2H ϕ,
(V,M) H ϕ ∨ ψ iff (V,M) H ϕ or (V,M) H ψ,
(V,M) H ϕ ∧ ψ iff (V,M) H ϕ and (V,M) H ψ,
(V,M) H CGϕ iff (V ′,M ′) H ϕ
for each H-compliant (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′).
By allowing only H-compliant states in the last clause of the semantics, the
underlying hypergraph H is assumed to be common knowledge. Assuming that
the hypergraph H is unknown turns out to be equivalent to the case where it
is common knowledge that the hypergraph H is complete, i.e., H = P(N)− ∅.
This might seem counter-intuitive, but it reflects the fact that if the hypergraph
is unknown then every player must consider it possible that every set A ⊆ N
might be a hyperarc in H. To denote the corresponding semantics, we use  as
abbreviation for H with H being the complete hypergraph.
For a word w = i1 . . . ik, we write Kw to abbreviate Ki1Ki2 . . .Kik , and
write ∼w to denote the concatenation ∼i1 ◦ . . . ◦ ∼ik .
Notice that (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′) iff there is w ∈ G∗ with (V,M) ∼w (V ′,M ′).
So an equivalent way of specifying the semantics for CG with non-singleton G
is as follows:
(V,M)  CGϕ iff (V,M)  Kwϕ for all w ∈ G∗. (?)
We now study the consequences of two choices in the analysis of players’ knowl-
edge:
• The type of messages; we assumed already that players send only atomic
information, but there still remains a choice whether, as assumed above,
players only send information they know initially, or can can send infor-
mation that they have learned from other players. The former scenario is
explored in Section 3, the latter in Section 4.
• The issue whether the underlying hypergraph is commonly known among
the players. We consider this distinction in both of the following sections.
We shall see that both choices have bearing on players’ knowledge.
4
3 Telling
In this section we study the case under the assumption mentioned above, that
players’ messages refer only to the facts they know initially. So players can send
only information they know at the outset. We call this contingency ‘telling’.
For the relevance of common knowledge ofH, consider the following example.
Example 3.1. For players G = {i, j, k}, H = {G}, p ∈ Atk and (V,M) = (∅, ∅),
we have
(V,M) H Ki¬Kjp.
Indeed, the only hyperarc in H through which player j could learn anything
from k is the one which also contains player i. So there is no way for k to tell j
anything ‘secretly’. Hence, with Mi = ∅, i also knows that Mjk = ∅. That is, in
all states which i considers possible at (V,M), k has not told j that p, therefore
in all these states j does not know p.
On the other hand, we have (V,M) 2 Ki¬Kjp, since (V,M) ∼i
({p}, {(k, {j, k}, p)}).
So for some formulas, common knowledge of H matters. Note also that in
this example, we even have
(V,M) H CG¬Kjp,
which shows that common knowledge can be attained without any communica-
tion taking place.
However, common knowledge of formulas from the positive language L+ can
only be attained through messages received by the whole group, and for these
formulas, common knowledge of H does not matter. In order to establish this,
we first show the following Lemma 3.2, which intuitively says that if a positive
formula is true in some state, then it remains true in any state where more facts
are true or more communication has taken place. Remember that  corresponds
to H with H being the complete hypergraph, so the following carries over to
general states and .
Lemma 3.2. For any ϕ ∈ L+ and H-compliant states (V,M) and (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ⊆ (V ′,M ′),
if (V,M) H ϕ, then (V ′,M ′) H ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. The only not completely
obvious case is when ϕ = CGψ with ψ ∈ L+. We show the claim for G = {i};
the non-singleton case then follows by induction and (?). Take an H-compliant
state (V ′′,M ′′) such that (V ′,M ′) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′). Let
(V ′′′,M ′′′) := (Vi ∪
⋃
j 6=i V
′′
j ,Mi).
We have Facts(Mi) ⊆ Facts(M) ⊆ V , since (V,M) is a state. Also, Mi ⊆
M ′i = M
′′
i ⊆ M ′′, so Facts(Mi) ⊆ Facts(M ′′) ⊆ V ′′, since (V ′′,M ′′) is a state.
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Hence, Facts(M ′′′) = Facts(Mi) ⊆ V ∩ V ′′ =
⋃
i∈N (Vi ∩ V ′′i ) ⊆ V ′′′. This
shows that (V ′′′,M ′′′) is a state. Moreover, (V,M) ∼i (V ′′′,M ′′′). Assume
now (V,M) H Kiψ. Then we obtain (V ′′′,M ′′′) H ψ. Further, we have
(V ′′′,M ′′′) ⊆ (V ′′,M ′′) since Vi ⊆ V ′i = V ′′i and Mi ⊆ M ′i = M ′′i due to
(V ′,M ′) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′). Thus, by induction hypothesis we obtain (V ′′,M ′′) H
ψ.
Theorem 3.3. For any H-compliant state (V,M) and ϕ ∈ L+,
(V,M)  ϕ iff (V,M) H ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction. The only non-trivial step is when
ϕ = CGψ with ψ ∈ L+.
(⇒) By induction hypothesis, (V,M)  CGψ implies (V,M) H CGψ, since
each H-compliant state is also a state.
(⇐) Assume to the contrary that (V,M) 2 CGψ. So there is a state (V ′,M ′)
with (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′) and (V ′,M ′) 2 ψ. Now let
M ′ H := {(·, A, ·) ∈M ′ | A ∈ H}.
So M ′ H consists of all H-compliant messages of M ′. Now note that
(V ′,M ′ H) ⊆ (V ′,M ′), so from (V ′,M ′) 2 ψ we obtain that (V ′,M ′ H) 2 ψ
using Lemma 3.2 (which, as noted, also holds for general states and ). Since
(V ′,M ′ H) is H-compliant, the induction hypothesis yields (V ′,M ′ H) 2H ψ.
Moreover, we also have (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′ H), since (V,M) is H-compliant
and (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′). Thus, (V,M) 2H CGψ.
In the remainder of this section, we are concerned with formulas from L+,
so in view of the above results we restrict attention to .
We now establish that CG distributes over disjunctions of positive formulas,
starting with singleton G.
Lemma 3.4. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+, i ∈ N , and state (V,M),
(V,M)  Ki(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M)  Kiϕ1 ∨Kiϕ2.
Proof. To deal with the (⇒) implication assume that (V,M) 2 Kiϕ1 ∨ Kiϕ2.
Then (V,M) 2 Kiϕ1 and (V,M) 2 Kiϕ2, i.e., there are (V ′,M ′) and (V ′′,M ′′)
such that
(V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) and (V ′,M ′) 2 ϕ1, as well as
(V,M) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′) and (V ′′,M ′′) 2 ϕ2.
Let now
(V ′′′,M ′′′) := (Vi ∪
⋃
j 6=i(V
′
j ∩ V ′′j ),Mi).
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Then Facts(M) ⊆ V , Facts(M ′) ⊆ V ′, Facts(M ′′) ⊆ V ′′, since (V,M),
(V ′,M ′) and (V ′′,M ′′) are states. Moreover, Mi = M ′i and Mi = M
′′
i . So,
Facts(M ′′′) ⊆ Facts(M) ∩ Facts(M ′) ∩ Facts(M ′′)
⊆ V ∩ V ′ ∩ V ′′
=
⋃
i∈N (Vi ∩ V ′i ∩ V ′′i )
⊆ V ′′′.
This shows that (V ′′′,M ′′′) is a state, and since M ′′′ = Mi ⊆ M it is H-
compliant.
Now since Vi = V ′i = V
′′
i and Mi = M
′
i = M
′′
i , we have (V
′′′,M ′′′) ⊆
(V ′,M ′) and (V ′′′,M ′′′) ⊆ (V ′′,M ′′). By Lemma 3.2, we obtain (V ′′′,M ′′′) 2
ϕ1 and (V ′′′,M ′′′) 2 ϕ2, thus (V ′′′,M ′′′) 2 ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. Furthermore (V,M) ∼i
(V ′′′,M ′′′), so (V,M) 2 Ki(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
Further, the (⇐) implication immediately holds by the semantics.
Theorem 3.5. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L+, state (V,M), and G ⊆ N ,
(V,M)  CG(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M)  CGϕ1 ∨ CGϕ2.
Proof. The claim follows directly from Lemma 3.4 and (?).
To see that this result does not hold if we allow negation, consider three
players i, j, k ∈ N , p ∈ Vk, (V,M) = (∅, ∅), and ϕ = Ki(Kjp ∨ ¬Kjp). Then
(V,M)  ϕ, since the used disjunction is a tautology, but there is no way for i
to know which disjunct is true.
Even with non-tautological disjunctions, the result does not hold.
Example 3.6. With p ∈ Vk and
(V,M) = ({p}, {(k, {i, k}, p)})
ϕ = Ki(Kjp ∨ ¬(Kjp ∨Kj¬p)),
we have (V,M)  ϕ, but again, i knows neither disjunct in (V,M). Intuitively,
having privately learned that p is true, i knows that j either also learned it, or
that j doesn’t know whether p is true, but i does not know which of these two
statements is true.
Another observation is that mutual knowledge of any fact p ∈ At can only
be obtained through a corresponding message, and is thus inseparably tied to
common knowledge.
Lemma 3.7. For any w ∈ N∗ with |Set(w)| ≥ 2, p ∈ At, and state (V,M), the
following are equivalent:
(i) (V,M)  Kwp,
(ii) there is (·, ·, p) ∈Mw,
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(iii) (V,M)  CGp with G = Set(w).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Assume that (ii) does not hold. Let V ′ := V \ {p}. Then
(V ′,Mw) is a state and (V ′,Mw) 2 p. Now let i ∈ N be such that p ∈ Ati. Since
|Set(w)| ≥ 2, there is j ∈ Set(w) with p 6∈ Atj . By construction, (V ′,Mw) 2 p
and (V,M) ∼j (V ′,Mw). Since j ∈ Set(w) and both (V,M) ∼k (V,M) and
(V ′,Mw) ∼k (V ′,Mw) for all k ∈ N , we obtain (V,M) ∼w (V ′,Mw) and thus
(V,M) 2 Kwp.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Suppose that G = Set(w) and take m ∈ Mw. Consider (V ′,M ′)
such that (V,M) ∼G (V ′,M ′). This means that for a sequence i1, . . ., ik of
players from G and some states (V 1,M1), . . ., (V k,Mk) we have (V,M) ∼i1
(V 1,M1) ∼i2 . . . ∼ik (V k,Mk), where (V ′,M ′) = (V k,Mk). But i1 ∈ G,
so m ∈ Mi1 , and consequently m ∈ M1i1 . Also i2 ∈ G, so m ∈ M1i2 , and
consequently m ∈M2i2 . Continuing this way we conclude that m ∈Mkik , that is
m ∈M ′ik .
Hence, m ∈ M ′. This shows that Mw ⊆M ′. So Facts(Mw)⊆ V ′, since
(V ′,M ′) is a state. But by the assumption p ∈ Facts(Mw), so (V ′,M ′)  p.
This proves (V,M)  CGp.
(iii)⇒ (i): By (?).
We can extend this connection between mutual and common knowledge to
arbitrary positive formulas.
Theorem 3.8. For any G ⊆ N , ϕ ∈ L+, and state (V,M),
(V,M)  CGϕ iff (V,M)  Kwϕ for some w ∈ G∗ with Set(w) = G.
Proof. The direction (⇒) is by (?).
For (⇐), we proceed by structural induction. The base case is obtained from
Lemma 3.7. The induction step for disjunction follows by Theorem 3.5, and for
conjunction it follows directly by definition of the semantics. For ϕ = Kiψ, the
assumption (V,M)  KwKiψ yields, by induction hypothesis, that (V,M) 
CG′ψ for G′ = Set(w) ∪ {i} = G ∪ {i}, which by definition of the semantics
implies that (V,M)  CGKiψ.
Note that this result provides for positive formulas a simplified characteri-
zation of the common knowledge operator, as compared with (?).
Finally, we establish a result intuitively saying that a group’s common knowl-
edge of a positive formula can only be achieved when some message (or messages)
has been broadcast to at least all members of this group. So common knowl-
edge of a positive formula cannot be achieved among a group by means of more
limited communications, for example point-to-point messages. Given a formula
ϕ we denote by Facts(ϕ) the set of facts that occur in it.
Theorem 3.9. For any G ⊆ N with |G| ≥ 2, ϕ ∈ L+, and state (V,M),
if (V,M)  CGϕ, then there is (·, A, p) ∈M with G ⊆ A and p ∈ Facts(ϕ).
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Proof. By Theorem 3.5 and the definition of semantics, we can transform CGϕ
into an equivalent formula consisting only of disjunctions and conjunctions over
formulas of the form CGCG1 . . . CGlp with G1, . . . , Gl ⊆ N and p ∈ Facts(ϕ).
Since (V,M)  CGϕ there is at least one of these formulas for which (V,M) |=
CGCG1 . . . CGlp.
Take now w such that Set(w) = G. By (?) we obtain (V,M) 
KwCG1 . . . CGlp, so by the definition of semantics (V,M)  Kwp. The claim
now follows by Lemma 3.7.
4 Forwarding
We now consider a more complex situation in which players are allowed to send
facts that they learned from other players. We call this contingency ‘forwarding’.
It is achieved by relaxing in the definition of a message (i, A, p) the assumption
p ∈ Ati to p ∈ At. We still insist that a player can send a message only to a
group to which he belongs, that is, that i ∈ A holds.
We also assume that only information known to be true is sent, so we now
need to examine how a player learned the information he is sending. This brings
us to consider the following relation on the set of messages:
(j, B, p) (i, A, p) iff p 6∈ Ati and i ∈ B.
Intuitively, (j, B, p)  (i, A, p) means that the fact p is initially not known to
player i and that he has learned it from a message sent by player j to a group
to which i belongs. So (j, B, p)  (i, A, p) means that (j, B, p) is a possible
(partial) explanation of (i, A, p).
By a state we now mean a pair (V,M) such that for each message (i, A, p) ∈
M a sequence of messages (j1, B1, p), . . ., (jk, Bk, p) exists (i.e., each of these
messages about p is in M) such that
• these messages form an explanatory chain: for l ∈ {1, . . ., k − 1} we have
(jl, Bl, p) (jl+1, Bl+1, p);
• they are not circular: players j1, . . ., jk are all different;
• p is initially known to player j1: p ∈ Vj1 ; and
• the fact p reaches player i: (jk, Bk, p) = (i, A, p).
We call such a sequence of messages an explanation for (i, A, p) in (V,M). So
a pair (V,M) is a state if for each of its messages it has an explanation.
Note that given a state, its messages contain only true facts. That is, if
(V,M) is a state, then Facts(M)⊆ V . Moreover, if (i, A, p) ∈M , then player i
knows that p is true, i.e. (V,M)  Kip. (A more general statement is established
in Lemma 4.5.) Note also that when each message in M is of the form (i, ·, p),
where p ∈ Vi, then (V,M) is a state, since each message then forms its own
explanation. So states considered in this section generalize the states considered
in the previous section.
Each state can be alternatively viewed as a partial ordering  ∗ (where  ∗
is the reflexive, transitive closure of the  relation) on a set of messages such
that each message has an explanation.
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The only restriction on the order of the actions comes from the relation  
that needs to be respected: a player sends a message that contains information
that either he initially knows to be true (the message is (i, A, p) where p ∈ Vi)
or he has learned (the message is (i, A, p) and some earlier message is of the
form (j, B, p), where i ∈ A). So the computation begins by some players who
send information they know is true.
We now consider the semantics introduced in Section 2 in this extended
setting. It is important to realize that these two semantics differ in the sense
that for a state and a formula ϕ ∈ L it can happen that (V,M) H ϕ holds in
the sense of Section 2 but not in the sense considered now.
Example 4.1. Let N = {i, j, k}, H = {{i, j}, {j, k}}, V = {p}, where p ∈ Ati,
and M = {(i, {i, j}, p)}. Then we have
(V,M) H Ki¬Kkp
in the sense of Section 2. The intuitive reason is that the fact p ‘belongs’ to i,
so it cannot be used in any message sent by j, and this information is known to
i. However, in the present setting p can be used in a message sent by j and we
have
(V,M) 2H Ki¬Kkp.
Indeed, consider (V ′,M ′) with V ′ = {p} and M ′ = {(i, {i, j}, p), (j, {j, k}, p)}.
Then (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′) and (V ′,M ′)  Kkp.
In general, only non-epistemic formulas have the same meaning w.r.t. both
semantics.
We now show that some, though not all, properties established in the pre-
vious section also hold in this new setting. In particular, as in Example 3.1, we
have (∅, ∅) H CG¬Kjp, so also now common knowledge can exist without any
communication taking place. However, as we shall see, Theorem 3.3 does not
hold in general any more. So in the following we usually consider H , which,
as mentioned earlier, includes  as a special case with H being the complete
hypergraph.
Recall that for a formula ϕ we denoted the set of facts that occur in it by
Facts(ϕ).
Lemma 4.2. For any ϕ ∈ L+ and H-compliant state (V,M) if (V,M) H ϕ,
then Facts(ϕ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. The only not completely
obvious case is when ϕ = CGψ. But (V,M) H CGψ implies (V,M) H ψ,
so in this case the induction hypothesis readily applies, as well.
The following result is then a counterpart of Theorem 3.9.
Theorem 4.3. For any G ⊆ N with |G| ≥ 2, ϕ ∈ L+, and H-compliant state
(V,M),
if (V,M) H CGϕ, then there is (·, A, p) ∈M with G ⊆ A and p ∈ Facts(ϕ).
10
Proof. Note that the conclusion of the implication can be written in a more
succinct way as Facts(ϕ)∩Facts(⋂i∈GMi) 6= ∅. Suppose that (V,M) H CGϕ
and Facts(ϕ)∩Facts(⋂i∈GMi) = ∅. Call a message a p-message if it is of the
form (·, ·, p). Abbreviate ⋃i∈GMi to MG (Note that this is different from Mw,
where w is a word, which corresponds to an intersection.) Three cases arise.
Case 1. For all p ∈ Facts(ϕ) there is no p-message in MG and Facts(ϕ)∩V = ∅.
Then by Lemma 4.2 (V,M) 2H ϕ.
Case 2. For all p ∈ Facts(ϕ) there is no p-message in MG and Facts(ϕ)∩V 6= ∅.
Take some p ∈ Facts(ϕ) ∩ V . Since |G| ≥ 2, there is i ∈ G such that
p 6∈ Vi. Remove from V the fact p and from M all p-messages. Denote the
outcome by (V ′,M ′). By construction (V ′,M ′) is an H-compliant state and by
the assumption there is no p-message in Mi, so (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′).
Case 3. For some p ∈ Facts(ϕ) there is a p-message in MG.
Given a set of messages O ⊆M , we denote by top(O) the set of p-messages
m ∈ O, where p ∈ Facts(ϕ), such that for no m′ ∈ O we have m 6= m′ and
m ∗ m′. Further, we define (cl stands for the closure)
cl(m) := {m′ ∈M | m ∗ m′}.
We assumed that the set of p-messages in MG, where p ∈ Facts(ϕ), is non-
empty, so the set top(MG) is non-empty and hence for some i1 ∈ G the set
top(MG) ∩Mi1 is non-empty. Choose some m ∈ top(MG) ∩Mi1 . Let M ′ :=
M \ cl(m) and V ′ := V . By the assumption Facts(ϕ) ∩ Facts(⋂i∈GMi) = ∅,
so there is some i ∈ G such that i 6∈ A, where m is of the form (·, A, p) for
some p ∈ Facts(ϕ). By the construction (V ′,M ′) is an H-compliant state and
(V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′).
We now repeat the above case analysis with (V ′,M ′) instead of (V,M).
Iterating this way we eventually end up in Case 1 since in Cases 2 and 3 always
some fact or message is removed. This way we obtain a word w ∈ G∗ and an H-
compliant state (V ′′,M ′′) such that (V,M) ∼w (V ′′,M ′′) and (V ′′,M ′′) 2H ϕ.
By (?) this contradicts the assumption that (V,M) H CGϕ.
Corollary 4.4. For any G ⊆ N with |G| ≥ 2, p ∈ At, and H-compliant state
(V,M),
(V,M) H CGp iff there is (·, A, p) ∈M with G ⊆ A.
Proof. (⇒ ) is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.3.
(⇐ ) The proof is analogous to the one of the implication (ii) ⇒ (iii) of
Lemma 3.7 and is omitted.
Here is the counterpart of the above result for the case of one player. It
states that in any state a player knows a fact iff either he knows it at the outset
or he has learned it through a message he received.
Lemma 4.5. For any i ∈ N , p ∈ At, and H-compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H Kip iff p ∈ Vi ∪ Facts(Mi).
11
Proof. (⇒ ) Suppose that (V,M) H Kip and p 6∈ Vi ∪ Facts(Mi). Remove
from V the fact p and from M all messages of the form (·, ·, p). Denote the
outcome by (V ′,M ′). By construction (V ′,M ′) is an H-compliant state and by
the assumption (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′). So (V ′,M ′) H p, which is a contradiction.
(⇐ ) Consider an H-compliant state (V ′,M ′) such that (V,M) ∼i (V ′,M ′).
Then Vi = V ′i and Mi = M
′
i . So Vi ⊆ V ′ and Facts(Mi)⊆ Facts(M ′)⊆ V ′,
where the final inclusion follows by the fact that (V ′,M ′) is a state. So p ∈ V ′
and consequently (V ′,M ′) H p, as desired.
Corollary 4.6. For any i ∈ N , p ∈ At, and H-compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H Kip iff (V,M)  Kip.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4.5 and the fact that  is a special case of
H .
For further analysis we need an auxiliary concept. Suppose that
(V,M)⊆ (V ′,M ′), where (V ′,M ′) is a state. In general, (V,M) does not
need to be a state but we can complete it to a state L(V,M) such that
L(V,M)⊆ (V ′,M ′). Indeed, it suffices for each message m in M to add to
M messages forming an explanation of m in M ′ and then add to V the facts
used in these added messages. More precisely, let M ′′ be a smallest set such that
M ⊆M ′′ ⊆M ′ and (V ∪ Facts(M ′′),M ′′) is a state. In general, this does not
define a unique state, since each message in M ′ can have multiple explanations.
However, the states are finite, so we can always choose (V ∪ Facts(M ′′),M ′′)
in a unique way, for example, by associating with each state a unique natural
number.
From now on we assume that given an inclusion (V,M)⊆ (V ′,M ′) the state
L(V,M) is uniquely defined. Note that if (V ′,M ′) is H-compliant, then so are
(V,M) and L(V,M).
The following observation will be useful.
Fact 4.7. For any i ∈ N and H-compliant states (V,M), (V ′,M ′) with
(Vi,Mi)⊆ (V ′,M ′),
(V,M) ∼i L(Vi,Mi).
Proof. All messages in (Vi,Mi) involve player i, so the H-compliant state
(V ′′,M ′′) = L(Vi,Mi) is realized by adding to (Vi,Mi) only some messages
that do not involve player i and some facts from outside of Ati. Consequently
Mi = M ′′i and Vi = V
′′
i , that is (V,M) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′).
Next, the following property of the semantics will be needed.
Lemma 4.8. For any H-compliant state (V,M), G⊆N , and facts p1, . . ., pk,
(V,M) H CG(
∨k
j=1 pj) iff (V,M) H
∨k
j=1 CGpj.
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Figure 2: Knowledge of H matters even for positive formulas when forwarding
is allowed.
Proof. To deal with (⇒) we consider two cases.
Case 1. |G| = 1, say G = {i}.
Suppose that (V,M) 2H
∨k
j=1Kipj . Then for j ∈ {1, . . ., k} we have
(V,M) 2H Kipj and thus by Lemma 4.5 pj 6∈ Vi ∪ Facts(Mi). Let
(V ′′,M ′′) := L(Vi,Mi)
be the H-compliant state defined w.r.t. the inclusion (Vi,Mi)⊆ (V,M). This
state is realized by adding to Mi some messages from M and to Vi some facts
from Facts(Mi). So V ′′ ⊆ Vi∪Facts(Mi) and consequently for j ∈ {1, . . ., k} we
have pj 6∈ V ′′. Hence,
(V ′′,M ′′) 2H
∨k
j=1 pj .
Moreover, by Fact 4.7 we have (V,M) ∼i (V ′′,M ′′), so (V,M) 2H Ki(
∨k
j=1 pj).
Case 2. |G| ≥ 2.
By Lemma 4.2 for some j ∈ {1, . . ., k} there is (·, A, pj) ∈ M with G ⊆ A.
So, by Corollary 4.4, (V,M) H CGpj , and thus (V,M) H
∨k
j=1 CGpj .
The (⇐) implication holds directly by the definition of the semantics.
We can now resume our comparison with the results of the previous section.
To start with, the following result is a counterpart of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 4.9. For any ϕ ∈ L+ and H-compliant states (V,M) and (V ′,M ′)
with (V ′,M ′) ⊆ (V,M),
if (V ′,M ′) H ϕ, then (V,M) H ϕ.
Proof. By structural induction on ϕ.
In Section 3 we used this result to establish Theorem 3.3. However, in the
current setting the counterpart of Theorem 3.3 does not hold.
Example 4.10. Consider players N = {i, j, k, l} and a graph H with the edges
{l, k}, {k, j}, {j, i}, see Figure 2. Suppose that V = {p}, where p ∈ Atl, and
M = {(l, {l, k}, p), (k, {k, j}, p), (j, {j, i}, p)}. Then
(V,M) 2 KiKkp,
since player i does not know through which source player j learned p. However,
(V,M) H KiKkp,
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since when the underlying graph is commonly known, player i knows that
player j learned p from player k.
Still, a limited counterpart of Theorem 3.3 does hold. Let L+K be the sublan-
guage of L+ in which the knowledge operators CG are not allowed to be nested.
So if CGϕ ∈ L+K , then ϕ is a propositional formula that does not use negation.
Theorem 4.11. For any H-compliant state (V,M) and ϕ ∈ L+K ,
(V,M)  ϕ iff (V,M) H ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on ϕ. The only non-trivial case is
when ϕ = CGψ for some i ∈ N and ψ is a propositional formula that does not
use negation.
Let
∧k
j=1
∨mj
l=1 pj,l be the conjunctive normal form of ψ. So each pj,l is a
fact. By Lemma 4.8 and the definition of semantics we have both
(V,M)  CGψ iff (V,M) 
∧k
j=1
∨mj
l=1 CGpj,l
and
(V,M) H CGψ iff (V,M) H
∧k
j=1
∨mj
l=1 CGpj,l.
But by Corollary 4.6, for all j ∈ {1, . . ., k} and l ∈ {1, . . .,mj} we have
(V,M)  CGpj,l iff (V,M) H CGpj,l.
This implies the claim for CGψ.
We now analyze to what extent Theorem 3.5 holds in the current setting.
We first prove that the CG operator distributes over disjunctions of formulas
from the non-epistemic sublanguage L∧,∨ of L in which only conjunction and
disjunction is allowed.
Theorem 4.12. For any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L∧,∨, i ∈ N and H-compliant state (V,M),
(V,M) H CG(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff (V,M) H CGϕ1 ∨ CGϕ2.
Proof. Passing by the conjunctive normal forms of ϕ1 and ϕ2, the result follows
from the definition of the semantics and Lemma 4.8 twice.
However, the CG operator does not distribute over the knowledge operators,
so the counterpart of Theorem 3.5 does not hold.
Example 4.13. Consider the set of players N = {i, j, k, l, n} and the hyper-
graph H being the graph with the edges (n, k), (n, l), (k, j), (l, j), (j, i), see Fig-
ure 1(b). Take V = {p}, where p ∈ Atn, and
M = {(n, {n, k}, p), (k, {k, j}, p), (j, {j, i}, p)}.
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Then
(V,M) H Ki(Kkp ∨Klp),
but neither (V,M) H KiKkp, nor (V,M) H KiKkq holds. Informally, player i
knows that either player k or player l knows p but he does not know which one
of them knows p.
As noticed already after the proof of Theorem 3.5, the Ki operator does not
distribute over negation either; the same example applies here.
Finally, reconsider Theorem 3.8. It is straightforward to see that it does
not hold in the present setting, even for two players. Indeed, reconsider Exam-
ple 4.10. We showed there that (V,M) H KiKkp. However, it is easy to see
that (V,M) 2H C{i,k}p since (V,M) 2H KkKip.
5 Conclusions and related work
In this paper we studied various aspects of common knowledge in two simple
frameworks concerned with synchronous communication. It is useful to clar-
ify that our two impossibility results concerning the attainment of common
knowledge amongst players (Theorems 3.9 and 4.3) differ from the customary
impossibility results.
For example, Halpern and Moses (1990) formalize the epistemic aspects of
the celebrated Coordinated Attack Problem that consists in achieving common
knowledge (a ‘common plan of action’). They show (in Section 8) that in a
distributed system in which communication is not guaranteed, common knowl-
edge is not attainable. When communication is guaranteed, they show the same
result when there is no bound on message delivery times. In both situations the
proof assumes the existence of clocks and point-to-point communication.
The close correspondence between simultaneous events (in our system a
broadcast to the whole group) and common knowledge is pointed out by Fagin
et al. (1999). Their model of a distributed system consists of a set of linear
‘runs’ (histories), while we only assume a partial ordering ( ) between mes-
sages broadcast to groups, which are the only possible actions. We have shown
that in our framework, common knowledge of a positive formula is indeed in-
separably related to group communication, which corresponds to simultaneous
events. However, as we have seen, this does not hold of negative formulas, so the
relationship is not as obvious as it may seem. The results of Fagin et al. (1999)
may be seen to correspond to our Corollary 4.4, though we allow broadcasts
instead of just point-to-point communication.
Chandy and Misra (1986) consider the flow of information in distributed
systems with asynchronous communication. They study how processes ‘learn’
about states of other processes and how knowledge evolves. The main difference
is that with asynchronous communication, hypergraphs are equivalent to mere
point-to-point graphs. Without guarantees on the delivery time, and without
temporal reasoning, from the knowledge point of view sending an asynchronous
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group message has the same effect as sending a separate message to each group
member.
Our study concerning the consequences of the assumption whether the un-
derlying hypergraph is commonly known among the players brings our paper
somewhat closer to the area of social networks (see, e.g., Jackson (2008)).
Within logic, the relevance of epistemic issues in communication networks has
been recognized by a number of authors, e.g. van Benthem (2006). However, to
our knowledge the only work that addresses these issues is Pacuit and Parikh
(2007) and, to some extent, Roelofsen (2005). We now briefly discuss these
frameworks and relate them to our own.
Pacuit and Parikh (2007) use a history-based model to study diffusion of
information in a communication graph, starting from facts initially known to
individual players. Communicative acts are assumed to consist in a player j
‘reading’ an arbitrary propositional formula from another player i, with the
precondition that i knows that the formula holds. Communicative acts are
restricted to a commonly known, static, directed graph, and, unlike in our
case, are assumed to go unnoticed by i. The paper formalizes what conclusions,
beyond the mere factual content of messages, can be drawn using knowledge of
the communication graph and, consequently, knowledge of the possible routes
along which certain information can have flown.
Roelofsen (2005) uses a model based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL)
to describe how some initial epistemic model evolves in a communication situa-
tion. Communication is among subgroups and can contain arbitrary epistemic
formulas. Further, communication is assumed to be truthful and is restricted
to occur along a hypergraph. However the hypergraph is explicitly encoded in
the model, and thus (knowledge of it) is subject to change.
While under certain circumstances history-based modeling and DEL are
equivalent (van Benthem et al., 2007), our approach is more in the spirit
of Pacuit and Parikh (2007). Indeed, we also study how specific information
may have spread. Also, all possible communications are included in the model
and suspicions about them are not explicitly formed. Finally, the underlying
graph (in our case hypergraph) is static and not included in the model.
On a technical level, our approach differs from Pacuit and Parikh (2007)
in that we use sets of messages instead of sequences and, when dealing with
forwarding, employ a more general structure than histories by considering mes-
sages partially ordered by the relation  . On the other hand, our messages are
simpler: Pacuit and Parikh (2007) allow disjunctions of facts, while we allow
only facts.
What distinguishes our approach on a more conceptual level is that our
focus lies on identifying natural conditions that allow us to prove stronger re-
sults about knowledge, such as distributivity over disjunctions, or irrelevance of
(common) knowledge of the underlying hypergraph.
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6 Extensions
We conclude by listing a number of natural extensions of the considered frame-
work that are worthy of further study:
• We could equip the players with theories that their parts of valuations,
Vi, have to satisfy. In this extension we would assume that each player i
has a propositional theory Ti built from facts in Ati that he adheres to.
The theories Ti where i ∈ N then form a common knowledge among the
players. So each player j can assume that player i considers Vi such that
Vi is a model of Ti.
• We could consider more complex messages than simple atomic facts, for ex-
ample propositional formulas, or even epistemic formulas. Also, we could
study asynchronous communication, messages from unknown senders or
to an unknown group of recipients, and a counterpart of the blind copy
feature familiar from e-mails.
• In Section 4 we relaxed the assumption that in a message (i, A, p) it has
to be the case that p ∈ Ati, but we did still insist on the truthfulness of
messages, requiring that p ∈ V . We could further relax this assumption,
by insisting only that p ∈ At. This way we would model messages that
consist of possibly false (but credible) information. This would lead to a
study of beliefs (which can be false) rather than knowledge (which cannot)
and common beliefs rather than common knowledge.
• We could consider in this framework belief revision, by assuming that the
theory Ti of player i consists of his beliefs, which would then be revised
in view of received information. Alternatively, Ti could be the certain
knowledge of player i against which received information would be revised.
• We could assume that the players have different knowledge of the underly-
ing hypergraph, by assuming that for all i we have H ⊆Hi, where H is the
underlying hypergraph and Hi is its approximation known to i, and that
players learn H by exchanging messages. The messages would contain
information about which hyperarcs do not belong to H.
• Alternatively, we could study a setup in which each player has an indis-
tinguishability relation over hypergraphs. This would allow us to model
players’ partial knowledge of the underlying hypergraph.
We use the setting of the first item in (Apt et al., 2009) to reason about
iterated elimination of strategies in strategic games with interaction struc-
tures. These are strategic games in which there is a hypergraph over the set of
players (an interaction structure) and the players can communicate about their
preferences, initially only known to themselves, so that within each hyperarc
players can obtain common knowledge of each other’s preferences.
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